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Plato on Poetic and Musical Representation1 




Plato’s most infamous discussions of poetry in the Republic, in which he both develops original 
distinctions in narratology and advocates some form of censorship, raises numerous 
philosophical and philological questions. Foremost among them, perhaps, is the puzzle of why 
he returns to poetry in Book X after having dealt with it thoroughly in Books II–III, particularly 
because his accounts of the “mimetic” aspect of poetry are, on their face, quite different. How 
are we to understand this double treatment? Here I will focus on a single aspect of this question, 
the compatibility of the notion of µίµησις and its cognates in the two books. As Nickolas 
Pappas has said, “Whether Books 3 and 10 offer compatible accounts of mimêsis, and how one 
might make them compatible, remains the most controversial question about Plato’s 
aesthetics”.2 I will show that there is a single notion of µίµησις operative throughout, namely 
that of representation by resemblance. I will take an unusual tack. I will not begin with the 
most problematic part of Book III for this interpretation about poetic, linguistic µίµησις, but 
with the later sections on musical µίµησις. Once we have an account of this, I claim, it is easier 
to see how narrative µίµησις is also a kind of representation by resemblance. I will begin in 
section 2 with the problem posed by the two books and introduce two of the most plausible 
previous accounts, those of Elizabeth Belfiore and Gabriel Lear. In section 3, I will introduce 
the notion of representation by resemblance through an examination of Book X. Then in section 
4, I will devote significant attention to the non-poetic, musical examples of µίµησις in Book 
III, which received little or no attention in previous accounts, before moving on to the poetic 
case. I close in section 5 by applying my account to poetic µίµησις in Book III. 
                                               
1 Thanks to the audiences at the Platonic Mimesis Revisited conference at Tübingen University, the Higher 
Seminar in the History of Philosophy at Uppsala University, and the Erlangen Oberseminar for discussion, 
especially Stefan Brandt, Klaus Corcilius, Gerhard Ernst, Antonio Ferro, Hallvard Fossheim, Stephen Halliwell, 
Béatrice Lienemann, Erasmus Mayr, M.M. McCabe, Olof Pettersson, Pauliina Remes, Pauline Sabrier, and Oda 
Tvedt. I am also grateful for conversations with Spencer Klavan and Hong Yu Wong, which have pushed me to 
contextualize and clarify my discussion in important ways. Jonathan Fine, Julia Pfefferkorn, Antonino Spinelli, 
and Peter West discussed drafts of the paper and provided enormous help. 
2 Pappas 2017. There is a distinct but related question about the relationship between the two discussions: namely 
why poetic representation of virtuous people is permitted in Book III but not in Book X. On this, see Moss 2007. 
In this chapter I will not have space to address this question except insofar as it relates to the possibility that there 
are different meanings of µίµησις in these two passages. 
Forthcoming in Julia Pfefferkorn and Antonino Spinelli (eds.), Platonic Mimesis 
Reconsidered (Academia). Please cite published version. 
 
 
2. The Problem and Previous Accounts 
 
The basic problem concerning the compatibility of the notion of µίµησις in the two books is 
one of extension. In Book III, there are three kinds of poetry, only one of which is mimetic, 
whereas in Book X all poetry is mimetic. On the Book III account, there are three kinds of 
poetic narration: simple narration, mimetic, and mixed (R. 392d5–6=T6 infra). In mimetic 
narration, such as drama, the poet or actor speaks as if they were the person represented by 
using, for example, first person pronouns to refer to someone other than themselves. In simple 
narration, as in Sappho, the poet speaks in her own voice. Mixed narration, such as that of 
Homer, alternates between these two. So, it seems that here, at most two of the three kinds of 
poetic narration have anything to do with µίµησις.  
Book X begins with a striking reference back to III’s “banishment of all poetry insofar as it is 
mimetic” (R. 595a5), which Socrates claims can now be made “more clearly” given the 
intervening discussion of the soul. However, he proceeds to discuss tragic, epic, and even lyric 
poetry as examples of µίµησις, not restricting himself to kinds of poetry with mimetic or mixed 
narration. Thus, in Book X, it seems that even poetry with simple narration would count as 
mimetic. While it might seem that the claim “insofar as it is mimetic” above is restrictive, 
throughout the discussion Socrates freely includes forms of poetry that were explicitly not 
classified as mimetic in Book III (e.g., 607a–d). 
This puzzle has received two sorts of resolutions in the literature: some claim that Plato shifts 
the meaning of µίµησις between the books, while others try to find a core meaning that resolves 
the tension above.3 The second sort of solution is generally to be preferred, since the direct 
back reference at R. 595a5 leads the reader to expect a continuity of meaning. Indeed, the 
motivation for the first type of solution depends on there not being a suitable core meaning 
shared between the books. I will be arguing for the second type of solution and so will 
concentrate here on other answers of this type. 
According to Elizabeth Belfiore, the core meaning of µίµησις throughout the Republic is “to 
make one thing like another in sound or shape”, which is to be distinguished from being 
µιµητική, which Belfiore understands as “imitation of many things”.4 She is able to make sense 
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4 Belfiore 1984, 126. 
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of the reference to Book III at R. 595a5 by claiming that this was only to do with µίµησις of 
many things. However, this account cannot make sense of the deeper point that Socrates has 
dramatically expanded the generic range, including epic and lyric poetry indiscriminately 
under the category of µίµησις in Book X, without having done so in Book III. Further, when 
Plato discusses musical µίµησις, both beneficial and harmful types of musical modes and 
rhythms are said to represent one kind of character, following the work of the sophist-
musicologist Damon. The case of music, I shall argue in more detail below, is one place where 
we see Plato’s theory of µίµησις most clearly. 
Gabriel Lear describes µίµησις in terms of creating “an appearance other than an appearance 
of [oneself]”.5 Here the thought is that those who engage in µίµησις effect a change in their 
appearance, so that they no longer appear as themselves but as something else. Her emphasis 
on resemblance between two objects is crucial. However, the idea of changing one’s 
appearance to something else is again not central to cases of µίµησις outside of the poetic realm 
and arguably does not even occur in cases of simple narration. Again, musical modes do not 
have an “appearance” that is somehow changed. Plato does not say that the lyre player or the 
lyre tuning seem to be courageous, for instance, when someone plays a tune on the lyre in the 
Dorian mode, even though that mode is somehow µίµησις of courage. The player, indeed, does 
not enter into the account at all and there is nothing else that could plausibly stand for the thing 
whose appearance is changed. Nor again do paintings, as discussed in either Book III or X 
explicitly have this feature. Socrates could have said that the painter somehow disguises the 
medium when painting it, but this does not seem to play any important role in his account of 
painting, nor should it. 
In place of these accounts, I will suggest that we understand µίµησις generally as representation 
by resemblance. By this, I do not mean that the representation consists in resemblance, which 
is problematic for the purely logical reason that representation is not symmetric, while 
resemblance is. Rather, as will become clearer in what follows, the representational aspect is 
grounded in the resemblance between mimetic object and model.6 The connection between 
µίµησις and representation has been made in other contexts by Stephen Halliwell,7 even though 
                                               
5 Lear 2011, 201. 
6 For a contemporary account of mimetic images along similar lines to the account presented here, see Kulvicki 
2006. The notion that representation requires resemblance played an important role in early modern philosophy 
of mind. On this, see Fasko/West (2020). 
7 Halliwell 2002, 6 et passim forcefully argues that µίµησις generally characterizes the “representational” arts, 
both in their “world-reflecting” and “world-creating” aspects. 
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he is skeptical of its application to Plato’s many and varied discussions of µίµησις. In this paper 
I do not claim to unify all of the uses even in the Republic, only those in Books III and X which 
need to be connected for Socrates’ argumentation to be successful. In the next section, I will 
unpack my version of the representation account through a reading of Book X. 
 
3. Representation by Resemblance in Book X 
 
After the back reference to Book III, Socrates promises to give an account of µίµησις in general, 
surprisingly, perhaps, by focusing on one particular example: painting a picture of a bed. A 
bed, on Socrates’ account, is produced by a craftsman who is looking at the “form of the bed”, 
which in turn was made by a god. The painter, although he does not make a real bed, does 
make a bed in some sense.8 The basic idea, then, seems to be that we can understand µίµησις 
through the three beds in the ontological hierarchy: the god’s bed, the carpenter’s bed, the 
painter’s bed. This holds for all forms of µίµησις (R. 597e).  
The hierarchy, however, does not really explain what µίµησις consists in, beyond the fact that 
it is, as Socrates says, “at a third remove from the truth”. We don’t yet know, that is, what one 
must do to µιµεῖσθαι something. This is explained in detail in what follows. 
 
[T1] Now, tell me this about a painter. Do you think he tries in each case to represent (µιµεῖσθαι) 
the thing itself in nature (ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον) or the works of craftsmen?  
The works of craftsmen.  
As they are or as they appear? (Ἆρα οἷά ἐστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται;) You must be clear about that.  
How do you mean?  
Like this. If you look at a bed from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a different 
bed each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all different? And is that also 
the case with other things?  
That’s the way it is—it appears different without being so.  
Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it represent in relation 
to what is as it is (πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει), or does it represent in relation to what appears as it appears 
(πρὸς τὸ φαινόµενον, ὡς φαίνεται)? Is it a representation of appearances or of truth?  
Of appearances. (R. 598a1–b5)9  
 
                                               
8 Although this might sound initially strange, it comports well with our ordinary ways, even in English, of talking 
about art. We might interrupt someone painting, who says “Hold on, I’m finishing the hands.”, which would be 
patently untrue if the “hands” had to be composed of flesh and bone. 
9 Translations of Plato are those of Cooper/Hutchinson 1996, with sometimes significant alterations. In particular, 
I translate cognates of mimeisthai with cognates of “represent”. The Greek text of the Republic used is that of 
Slings 2003. 
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T1 answers two central questions about the process of µίµησις, which together entail that Plato 
is understanding µίµησις as representation by resemblance. First, the model of a µίµησις is not 
a form. This distinguishes the painter from the carpenter, who, on Socrates’ account, uses the 
form of the bed as his model. Second, an act of µίµησις recreates not the thing as it is, but 
merely as it appears, with the result that the product is like the model with respect to its 
appearance.10 
While this account seems pretty plausible when it comes to painting a bed, it becomes 
somewhat strained when applied in general to all forms of µίµησις. When I compose a tune 
with rhythm and melody, is there something sensible which I consider and whose appearance 
is recreated in that rhythm or melody? What about a poem? If the answer is yes, as it apparently 
must be if this account is as general as Plato insists that it is, we must understand the “model” 
and its “appearance” in very abstract, structural terms.  
A model for a µιµητής need not be an artifact, like a bed. Based on the reasoning in this passage, 
it can also be something found in the natural world, such as a person or a mountain. While 
there is, in general, significant dispute about whether Plato is committed to forms of artifacts,11 
in this passage it is absolutely essential to the argument that there is a form of bed. In general, 
it seems that a model can be anything that participates in a form and can thus be multiple.12 
This is compatible with the idea that the µιµητής takes their models from craftsmen, since in 
many places (especially the Timaeus 28a–29a, Philebus 27b, and Sophist 265a–e), the natural 
world is said to be the product of a craftsman. But what can we glean about the “modeling” 
relation from this passage? I suggest that it is best understood as the relation of representation. 
For Socrates explains that, whether the model is a form or a participant, one’s product is in 
relation to (πρὸς) the real/apparent thing and as (ὡς) it is/appears. 
Second, the “appearance” of that model must be understood in a quite general way.13 Plato 
does seem here to be focusing on sensible qualities, but if we are to apply this account to poetry, 
                                               
10 Socrates doesn’t give any examples of how one might “µιµεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ ὄν”. However, there is a parallel 
distinction drawn in the Cratylus (423d4–424a6), on which language is said to µιµεῖσθαι οὐσίαν, in contrast with 
the arts, which only do so for sensible qualities. It is not clear to me whether Socrates endorses this account of 
language in either dialogue. However, the distinction drawn in the R. X passage leaves open that possibility for 
such an account of linguistic representation. For more on the Cratylus, see Pavani’s contribution to this volume. 
11 See, for example, Aristotle’s De ideis (Alex. Aphr. In Metaph. 80,5–6). 
12 It is here where we get one of the few explicit mentions of the “one over many” principle (R. 596d) as well as 
an argument for the uniqueness of forms (R. 597b–c).  
13 One question about how to understand “appearances” here that I want to leave open is whether they are mind-
independent properties of art objects or somehow dependent on the mind of the observer and/or artist. In most of 
these passages, it seems to me that Plato speaks as if the former were the case. However, in Sph. 235d4–236b7, 
he seems to make a distinction precisely along these lines between cases of µίµησις that preserve the correct 
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we would have to say that, in some sense, the language sounds like what it is modeled upon. 
That is, we do not want to say that the word “dog” sounds like a dog. Rather, taking into account 
the performance context, the most that can be said is perhaps that the words spoken by an actor 
sound similar to how they would sound if spoken by the character played by that actor. At first 
this might seem completely outlandish. We don’t want to saddle Socrates with the idea that 
spoken words must bear sensible resemblance to material objects, or worse, immaterial things 
like character traits. We should be careful here to distinguish what we might want to call the 
merely linguistic aspect of poetry, which it has in common with prose, and its poetic aspect.14 
Socrates himself explains this difference in Book III as the difference between metrical and 
non-metrical language, when he changes the speech of Chryses to simple narration. For there 
he claims that he will not use meter because he is not poetical (φράσω δὲ ἄνευ µέτρου· οὐ γάρ 
εἰµι ποιητικός, R. 393d7). Thus it seems like he is committed to the claim that the defining 
feature of poetry is meter. So in saying that all poetry is µίµησις of appearance, he is 
presumably saying something about poetic meter. While it is nevertheless unclear how this will 
work in practice, that is, what the meter is supposed to represent by resemblance, we have no 
longer the problem of saying that the words themselves must resemble what they represent. As 
will be clear below, it seems most likely that Plato understood meter in much the same way as 
he understood rhythm.15 
In suggesting that Socrates gives this account, I do not mean that it is without its problems. In 
particular, the appeal to resemblance has been subjected to a thorough critique in contemporary 
aesthetics by Nelson Goodman, who claims it to be a “most naïve view of representation”16. 
Goodman’s fundamental objection to resemblance accounts of representation is that they 
cannot accommodate the fact that everything resembles everything else in some respect. Thus, 
while there are respects in which a picture (for example) resembles its subject, there are also 
respects in which it resembles any other arbitrary thing, and there is no reason to prefer the 
ways in which it resembles its subject as opposed to anything else. 
I do not want to suggest that Plato has a response to this worry in exactly the form in which 
Goodman puts it. However, he does clearly engage with related issues in a variety of dialogues 
                                               
proportions and thus objectively correlate to the model, and those in which this merely seems to be the case. On 
this passage, see Lienemann 2010, 275 ff. and Strobel in this volume. 
14 For such a distinction, see Aristotle Po. 1447a19–29. 
15 For the extremely tight connection between rhythm and meter in Greek music, see West 1992, 129–159 and 
D’Angour 2015, 193–7. 
16 Goodman 1976, 3. 
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that could indicate something of a response. In the Protagoras, for example, we see Protagoras 
claim that “anything at all resembles any other thing in some way” (Prt. 331d), even polar 
opposites like white and black. Indeed, the compresence of opposites apparently validates at 
least one version of the Goodman claim, since every sensible thing is both like and unlike (Prm. 
127e ff.). The Parmenides, as a whole, shows how puzzles about similarity and difference cut 
to the very heart of Plato’s theory of forms with the likeness regress argument (Prm. 132c–
133a).17  
So it seems to me that the Goodman-type worries are not out of place.18 There are several points 
Plato could make in response to Goodman. First, he could, as above, distinguish between 
resemblance grounding the representation and the representation consisting in resemblance. 
For the former kind of view, it is possible that there is more to something being a representation 
than merely that there is a resemblance relation. On its own, however, this does not help so 
much, since if any sort of resemblance would work, then we still would have the problem that 
the content of the representation would be left underdetermined. However, given Plato’s 
interest in perceptually salient similarities, we might be able to restrict the notion of 
resemblance sufficiently that mimetic relations won’t hold between any two objects 
whatsoever. This may not constitute of a complete response to Goodman’s worries, but it is at 
least the beginnings of a response. 
 
 
4. Mostly Musical µίµησις in Book III 
I have argued that the µίµησις in Book X is best understood as representation by resemblance 
and will now aim to extend this analysis to the various applications of the notion of µίµησις in 
Book III. I will first treat the musical examples for two reasons. First, these examples have 
been largely neglected in discussions of µίµησις in the Republic, which have focused almost 
exclusively on the poetic and pictorial examples.19 This despite the fact that the musical arts 
were among the first to be characterized as mimetic.20 Indeed, the probably very first use of 
                                               
17 On the notion of resemblance in Plato’s metaphysics and its connection to problems in Goodman, see Ch. 12 
of Lienemann 2010. 
18 Thanks to Stephen Halliwell for pressing the Goodman objection and M.M. McCabe for suggesting the 
relevance of the broader metaphysical questions to its answer. 
19 Since Schofield 2010 made the same complaint over a decade ago, there has been little change in the situation. 
There have been, however, a number of important studies of the role of music in Platonic education: Woerther 
2008 and Pelosi 2010, Ch. 1. 
20 See Halliwell 2002, 15 ff. 
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the µιµ-root in Greek in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo (162–4) describes the way that the song 
and dance of the Delian maidens represent the voice and rhythm of all men.21 Second, as we 
will see in the next section, the account of rhythm will actually resolve difficulties in Plato’s 
account of poetic µίµησις. The consideration of music thus seems to me to be necessary for a 
complete understanding of Plato’s account of mimetic arts generally. 
We begin at the transition to music at 398b6–c2, where Socrates announces that he has 
completed his discussion concerning language and stories (περὶ λόγους τε καὶ µύθους) and now 
is transitioning to talk about the song-forms and melodies (περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ µελῶν).22 He 
then proceeds to analyze this in broadly three dimensions: harmony and rhythm, and 
instrumentation, arguing that they will follow the same patterns. Socrates does not assume at 
the outset that these are going to be given mimetic analyses, but as we will see, he will do so. 
After suggesting that the modes appropriate to lamentation (Mixolydian and Syntonolydian) 
and those “soft” modes appropriate to drinking parties (Ionian and Lydian) are to be jettisoned, 
only the Dorian and Phrygian modes are left. After this, he gives a more general set of 
considerations in favor of the same conclusion, bringing in the notion of µίµησις. 
 
[T2] I don’t know all the musical modes. Just leave me the mode that would suitably represent 
the tone and rhythm of a courageous person who is active in battle or doing other violent deeds, 
or who is failing and facing wounds, death, or some other misfortune, and who, in all these 
circumstances, is fighting off his fate steadily and with self-control. Leave me also another mode, 
that of someone engaged in a peaceful, unforced, voluntary action, persuading someone or asking 
a favor of a god in prayer or of a human being through teaching and exhortation, or, on the other 
hand, of someone submitting to the supplications of another who is teaching him and trying to 
get him to change his mind, and who, in all these circumstances, is acting with moderation and 
self-control, not with arrogance but with understanding, and is content with the outcome. Leave 
me, then, these two modes, which will best represent the violent or voluntary utterances of those 
who are moderate and courageous, whether in good fortune or in bad.23 (R. 399a5–c4) 
                                               
21 The interpretation of this passage is controversial. However, there has been a general trend towards 
understanding “µιµεῖσθ᾽” in terms of representation rather than copying in e.g., Peponi 2009, Halliwell 2002, 15 
ff. Peponi 2009, 64, however, thinks that the “voice and rhythm” is only the means of representation, not the end. 
However, this seems in conflict with the verse 163, where the bard observes “to each it would seem that they 
themselves were uttering”, which seems to suggest similarity (indeed, indistinguishability) between the means of 
representation and the ends. 
22 According to Reeve’s translation, there is a generic shift to “lyric odes and songs”, but what follows does not 
seem to be restricted to such genres and apparently applies to any of the many poetic genres which were set to 
music. Indeed, it would be very strange on this translation that Socrates requires that the music follow the words 
(398d), a clear back reference to the earlier section.  
23 Οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὰς ἁρµονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἁρµονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε πολεµικῇ πράξει ὄντος 
ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόντως ἂν µιµήσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσῳδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς 
τραύµατα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἴς τινα ἄλλην συµφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγµένως καὶ 
καρτερούντως ἀµυνοµένου τὴν τύχην. Καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ µὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑκουσίῳ πράξει ὄντος, 
ἤ τινά τι πείθοντός τε καὶ δεοµένου, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νουθετήσει ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τοὐναντίον ἄλλῳ δεοµένῳ 
ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ µεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν ὑπέχοντα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ µὴ ὑπερηφάνως ἔχοντα, 
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In this passage, I suggest, µίµησις is used in a way very close to that of Book X.24 First, we 
should note that Socrates moves freely between talking of a mode “representing” a character 
and a mode being of that character, using here clearly the objective genitive, much in the way 
that a painting or a thought is of its subject. This language seems to me to be very much in line 
with the way that representational notions appeared in the bed-passage of Book X.25 Moreover, 
Socrates is here emphasizing the “φθόγγους τε καὶ προσῳδίας” of the subjects—literally the 
sounds and variations in pitch that issue from a moderate or courageous person, presumably in 
speech.26 That is to say, the proper objects of harmonic µίµησις are said to be specifically 
auditory. The musical sound (whether vocal or auditory) is similar to and thereby represents 
the vocal cadence of a person with a certain character trait (say, courage) in a context in which 
that character trait shines through (say, war). Plato’s point here seems to parallel quite closely 
the account of the maidens’ mimetic abilities in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo: 
 
They know how to represent the voices of all men and the castanets rattling.  
To each it would seem that they themselves were uttering. 
This is how their beautiful song was composed.27 (162–4, my translation) 
 
The fact that Plato, like the author of the hymn, is emphasizing the particularly auditory 
qualities (the cognates of φθέγγεσθαι are particularly notable in this context) of the subject 
strongly suggests that the manner of representation is through resemblance. If mimetic 
representation need not be mediated by some resemblance, then the fact that the sound 
represents some other sound and not, say, a color, would be completely incidental. That is to 
say, what determines the content of the representation (e.g., the fact that the Dorian mode 
represents the courageous tone of voice) derives from the auditory similarity between the mode 
and the cadences of a courageous person. 
                                               
ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε καὶ µετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. Ταύτας δύο 
ἁρµονίας, βίαιον ἑκούσιον, δυστυχούντων εὐτυχούντων, σωφρόνων ἀνδρείων [ἁρµονίας], αἵτινες φθόγγους 
µιµήσονται κάλλιστα, ταύτας λεῖπε. 
24 Pace Schofield 2010, 242, who surprisingly claims that in Book III, music is representational but that poetic 
µίµησις in Book X is not representational. 
25 For the representational aspect of music, see Klavan 2019 and Woerther 2008. There is some oscillation in the 
literature of musical µίµησις between talking of “representation” and “expression”. I do not see a huge gap 
between these two, but insofar as “representation” makes more sense of the continuity between music, painting, 
and poetry, which are all described as mimetic in Book III. 
26 Schofield 2010 238 ff. 
27 πάντων δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς καὶ κρεµβαλιαστὺν / µιµεῖσθ᾽ ἴσασιν· φαίη δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος / φθέγγεσθ᾽· 
οὕτω σφιν καλὴ συνάρηρεν ἀοιδή. Text West 2003, except that I retain the other manuscript variant 
“κρεµβαλιαστὺν” on which, see Halliwell 2002, Peponi 2009. 
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This point is perhaps best appreciated by comparing Plato’s account of musical representation 
with Aristotle’s in the Politics, which contains a superficially very similar account of harmonic 
representation, where different harmonies again correspond to different character traits.28 
There he claims that melody differs from painting in that, while the latter can only depict 
character and emotion via shapes and colors that are “signs” of character, melodies directly 
represent character traits (1340a30–b10). This, for Aristotle, explains the very special way in 
which music affects us. While Aristotle’s account does seem well-positioned to explain the 
particularity of music, it does so at a cost. It is difficult on this account to see exactly how a 
harmony can manage to represent in this way. If we say it is by mathematical proportion, then 
it would seem that anything with such a proportion would represent in the same way, but this 
of course is exactly the opposite as what Aristotle originally wanted. Plato’s view, by contrast, 
treats music in essentially the same way that Aristotle’s account treats painting. 
Finally, it is worth noting in detail the problem that this passage raises for accounts such as 
those of Belfiore and Lear. Pace Belfiore, here we have clear cases of µίµησις of one type of 
thing: the Dorian mode, for example, represents courageous speech. While there can surely be 
more than one instance of courageous speech, it is clear that the musical mode represents the 
type. This is compatible with Book X’s account since the courage that is being represented 
here is clearly not the form, but the sensible manifestation. Moreover, it is not plausible to see 
here Lear’s notion of making oneself appear other than one is, since a musical mode is not the 
sort of thing that could change its appearance. An instrument could change its tuning, but here 
the claim is not about the instrument but its attunement. Indeed, while she is correct that 
appearances are fundamentally involved, she is incorrect in thinking that µιµήµατα can appear 
in more than one way. While this is certainly true in the case of a tragic actor, the musical 
modes do not have this feature. 
After his account of the musical modes, Socrates makes what initially seems like a digression 
from the program of discussing harmony and rhythm by discussing appropriate 
instrumentation.  
 
                                               
28 For a valuable comparison between Plato’s accounts of musical µίµησις in the Republic and Laws with 
Aristotle’s account, see Woerther 2008, who correctly notes that for Aristotle, “musical mimesis alone can imitate 
characters directly” (100), a point which is missed by Halliwell 2011. 
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[T3] What about flute-makers and flute-players? Will you allow them into the city? Or isn’t the 
flute the most “many-stringed” of all? And aren’t the panharmonic instruments all 
representations (µίµηµα) of it?29 (R. 399d3–5) 
This passage is difficult for any interpretation, because here we are getting some kind of 
mimetic relation holding between two kinds of instruments. Nevertheless, I think my 
interpretation can make best sense of this. The panharmonic instruments were 1) developed 
with the aulos as a model (hence might be taken to imply some kind of representation) and 2) 
in particular aimed to have the same harmonic range.30 We cannot understand “µίµηµα” here 
as meaning something like “copy” in a straightforward sense, since then the panharmonic 
instruments would just be more auloi, not different kinds of instrument. Rather, we need to see 
the makers of instruments as aiming to replicate the auditory aspects of the aulos, in particular 
its ability to modulate. Thus, it seems to me that the account of representation by resemblance 
actually does a pretty good job of explaining why Plato chose here the language of µίµησις, 
since the newer instrument’s range is similar to the aulos, which in turn stood as a kind of 
“model” for it. 
Because Plato was particularly interested in the harmonic aspects of different instruments, it 
made sense for him to treat them in the section on harmony.31 After this, he transitions 
smoothly, as we would expect, to the discussion of the remaining topic: rhythm. 
[T4] Following the musical modes it is our ask to discuss the regulation of rhythm. We shouldn’t 
strive to have either subtlety or great variety in metrical feet. Rather, we should try to discover 
what are the rhythms of someone who leads an ordered and courageous life and, knowing these, 
force the meter and the tune to follow his words, not his words to them. What these rhythms 
actually are is for you to say, just as in the case of the modes.  
I really don’t know what to say. I can tell you from observation that there are three basic kinds 
of metrical feet out of which the others are constructed, just as there are four in the case of pitches. 
But I can’t tell you which sort represents which sort of life. 
Then we’ll consult with Damon as to which metrical feet are suited to slavishness, insolence, 
madness, and the other vices and which are suited to their opposites. I think I’ve heard him talking 
about an enoplion, which is a composite metrical phrase (although I’m not clear on this), and 
also about dactylic or heroic meter, which he arranged, I don’t know how, to be equal up and 
down in the interchange of long and short. I think he called one foot an iambus, another a trochee, 
assigning a long and a short to both of them. In the case of some of these, I think he approved or 
disapproved of the tempo of the foot as much as of the rhythm itself, or of some combination of 
                                               
29 Τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξῃ εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρµόνια 
αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα µίµηµα; 
30 I have not been able to confirm Socrates’ claim that historically auloi served as models for instruments like the 
trigonos or polychord kithara. The latter, however, were primarily associated with the “New Music” of the late 
5th century, while the earliest aulos representations date from the 8th century (West 1992, 82, 366–8). 
31 The connection between instrumentation and musical modes is made very clear in Lynch 2016, who shows that 
the modes that Plato accepts in this passage are exactly those that can be played on the lyre, whereas those rejected 
are particularly designed for the aulos. 
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the two—I can’t tell you which. But, as I said, we’ll leave these things to Damon, since to mark 
off the different kinds would require a long argument. Or do you think we should try it?32 (R. 
399e7–400c6) 
 
Despite the sketchiness of the account of rhythm here in comparison to what we find in the 
section on harmonics, the mimetic principles are exactly the same. What is difficult in this case 
is the rhythmic theory, but the basic ethical and psychological criteria that Socrates and 
Glaucon had discussed for harmonics are still operative. Here we are looking for the rhythm of 
someone orderly and courageous, and the objective genitive, as I have already argued, strongly 
suggests some notion of representation because the way that a courageous person moves stands 
as some kind of model for the rhythm.  
We do not get any specific information about how this representation comes about, whether it 
is by resemblance or not. However, comparison with the discussion of rhythm in the Laws 
provides some help.33 There dance is fundamentally connected with rhythm (Lg. 673d) and is 
said to concern the movements of various sorts of people. The Pyrrhic, for example, represents 
the motions of those engaged in war and seems to consist in motions that in some way resemble 
the motions of someone in battle (Lg. 814e–815e). If this is so, one would expect the rhythms 
of such music also to somehow resemble the pattern of movement of battle. Socrates does not 
give such an account of rhythm in the Republic, but it seems to fit well with the sort of account 
that he gave of harmony.  
The last discussion of µίµησις occurs when discussion turns away from music to the more 
general psychic qualities that are being sought for the young: εὐλογία, εὐαρµοστία, 
εὐσχηµοσύνη, εὐρυθµία. These terms are difficult to translate because of the many layers of 
meaning implied by them. Each term refers to a notion from the previous musico-poetic 
theorizing (λόγος as the content of poetry, ἁρµονία and ῥυθµός for music, perhaps σχῆµα for 
                                               
32 ἑπόµενον γὰρ δὴ ταῖς ἁρµονίαις ἂν ἡµῖν εἴη τὸ περὶ ῥυθµούς, µὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκειν µηδὲ παντοδαπὰς 
βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθµοὺς ἰδεῖν κοσµίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν· οὓς ἰδόντα τὸν πόδα τῷ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγῳ 
ἀναγκάζειν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ µέλος, ἀλλὰ µὴ λόγον ποδί τε καὶ µέλει. οἵτινες δ’ ἂν εἶεν οὗτοι οἱ ῥυθµοί, σὸν ἔργον, 
ὥσπερ τὰς ἁρµονίας, φράσαι. 
Ἀλλὰ µὰ Δί’, ἔφη, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ὅτι µὲν γὰρ τρί’ ἄττα ἐστὶν εἴδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς 
φθόγγοις τέτταρα, ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἁρµονίαι, τεθεαµένος ἂν εἴποιµι· ποῖα δ’ ὁποίου βίου µιµήµατα, λέγειν οὐκ ἔχω. 
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µέν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ µετὰ Δάµωνος βουλευσόµεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἢ µανίας καὶ 
ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθµούς· οἶµαι δέ µε ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς 
ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα ὀνοµάζοντος αὐτοῦ σύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον, καὶ ἡρῷόν γε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως διακοσµοῦντος καὶ 
ἴσον ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ µακρὸν γιγνόµενον, καί, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶµαι, ἴαµβον καί τιν’ ἄλλον 
τροχαῖον ὠνόµαζε, µήκη δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας  προσῆπτε. καὶ τούτων τισὶν οἶµαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ 
ἧττον ψέγειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθµοὺς αὐτούς· ἤτοι συναµφότερόν τι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µέν, 
ὥσπερ εἶπον, εἰς Δάµωνα ἀναβεβλήσθω· διελέσθαι γὰρ οὐ σµικροῦ λόγου. ἢ σὺ οἴει; 
33 For more on this issue, see Julia Pfefferkorn’s contribution to this volume. 
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dance?), and the abstract nouns formed with “εὐ” imply that these are done well as opposed to 
poorly. However, these terms also have broader ethical connotations, which is why Socrates 
can claim that they are features of the soul. Furthermore, he is able use this characterization to 
extend his discussion beyond the musico-poetic: 
 
 [T5] Now, surely painting is full of these qualities, as are all the crafts similar to it; weaving is 
full of them, and so are embroidery, architecture, and the crafts that produce all the other 
furnishings. Our bodily nature is full of them, as are the natures of all growing things, for in all 
of these there is grace and gracelessness. And gracelessness, bad rhythm, and disharmony are 
akin to bad words and bad character, while their opposites are akin to and are representations of 
the opposite, a moderate and good character.34 (401a1–8) 
 
Here, I conclude, we see the same pattern that we have been seeing so far in Book III. We can 
see the idea of representation by resemblance nicely expressed by the hendiadys “ἀδελφά τε 
καὶ µιµήµατα”. Immediately below (401b2 and b8) these crafts are also said to create an εἰκών 
of the good or bad person or character trait. Again, it seems to me that the crafts do not represent 
these qualities in abstraction, but rather embodied and sensible instantiations of them. The basic 
idea is then that the way to instill these good character traits in the young is by presenting them 
with representations of instances of those traits by aesthetic qualities similar to them, which 
are found in all of the mimetic arts when done well. By looking at a painting, for example, of 
a person acting with grace, we contemplate the grace that is represented by the painting and 
our souls are thereby improved.35 
 
5. Poetic Representation in Book III 
 
If what I said in sections 3 and 4 is correct, Plato is using “µίµησις” terminology in the same 
way at the end of Book III and the beginning of Book X. Thus, someone who posits a distinct 
use in the Book III discussion of poetry must not only say that the two books are inconsistent 
with one another, they must also claim that there is inconsistency within Book III itself. While 
                                               
34 Ἔστιν δέ γέ που πλήρης µὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δηµιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία 
καὶ οἰκοδοµία καὶ πᾶσα αὖ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωµάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν· 
ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχηµοσύνη ἢ ἀσχηµοσύνη. καὶ ἡ µὲν ἀσχηµοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθµία καὶ ἀναρµοστία 
κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἤθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ 
µιµήµατα. 
35 By framing this in terms of “representation” I do not mean to make this out to be a highly intellectual or 
reflective process. Representing something as graceful could involve little more than finding it to be beautiful 
upon seeing it. Thanks to Jonathan Fine for pressing me on this point. 
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it is not problematic if the meanings of terms shift in general, in this case, it would matter quite 
a lot. Socrates sees himself as giving tightly connected, parallel arguments about poetic style, 
musical modes, and rhythm based on the idea that these are all mimetic. If the notion of µίµησις 
itself were not stable within this argumentative web, that would be highly problematic for 
Socrates’ project. What I aim to show now is that the mimetic aspects of poetry that are 
discussed in III are consonant with the foregoing account. 
I begin with the division that drives the problem: 
 
[T6] And aren’t these narratives either narrative alone, or narrative through representation, or 
both?36 (R. 392d5–6) 
 
To repeat the puzzle that began the paper, how is it that here just one form of poetry can be 
mimetic while in Book X poetry as a whole is? Two things must be shown. First, we need to 
see why this passage is not inconsistent with the account in Book X. But this merely negative 
point is not sufficient for the argumentative aims of this paper, since we need some reason to 
think that the accounts are not merely consistent, but substantially the same. 
The first point, it seems to me, can be dealt with relatively quickly, drawing on a point made 
by Gabriel Lear, who claims: “Thus from the fact that there are some poems that are not 
mimetic when it comes to narration, it simply does not follow that there is any poetry that is 
utterly non-mimetic.” This point shows what is wrong with the most basic way of stating the 
puzzle above: the trichotomy of simple, mimetic, and mixed narration would only be 
inconsistent with the claims of Book X if poetry were exhausted by narration.37 But this is 
plainly false, since it neglects linguistic features of poetry such as meter as well as non-
linguistic features such as musical accompaniment, which were deeply intertwined with Greek 
poetic practice. 
The second point, however, requires a more thorough discussion of Plato’s conception of 
mimetic narration and poetry in general. We begin with how he describes mimetic narration. 
 
[T7] [T]he poet himself is speaking and doesn’t attempt to get us to think that the speaker is 
someone other than himself. After this, however, he speaks as if he were Chryses and tries as far 
as possible to make us think that the speaker isn’t Homer but the priest himself—an old man. 
                                               
36 Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἁπλῇ διηγήσει ἢ διὰ µιµήσεως γιγνοµένῃ ἢ δι’ ἀµφοτέρων περαίνουσιν; 
37 Halliwell 2009 defends an even stronger view that the typology in book III does not amount to a complete 
theory of narrative at all.  
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And he composes pretty well all the rest of his narrative about events in Troy, Ithaca, and the 
whole Odyssey in this way.  
That’s right.  
Now, the speeches he makes and the parts between them are both narrative?  
Of course.  
But when he makes a speech as if he were someone else, won’t we say that he makes his own 
style as much like that of the indicated speaker as possible?  
We certainly will.  
Now, to make oneself like someone else in voice or appearance is to represent the person one 
makes oneself like.  
Certainly.  
In these passages, then, it seems that he and the other poets effect their narrative through 
representation.  
That’s right.  
If the poet never hid himself, the whole of his poem would be narrative without representation.38 
(R. 393a6–d1) 
 
What is Homer described here as doing in the speech of Chryses? Narrating as if (ὥς or ὥσπερ) 
he were the one speaking. It does not seem that this “as if” mode is anything like fooling the 
audience that Chryses is speaking instead of Homer. Rather, the suggestion is that Chryses 
giving his own speech would differ from Homer merely narrating its content in his own voice. 
Perhaps the most notable difference would be the difference in the use of the first-person 
pronouns, which would have different referents in the two kinds of speech. It seems to me that 
the best way to capture this difference is by thinking of the “as if” in terms of self-
representation.39 That is, when a speaker engages in mimetic narration, in their speech they 
represent themselves as the “other”. 
Moreover, Homer is said to be doing this by “making his own style as much like that of the 
indicated speaker as possible” and this way of making his own style similar to another’s is said 
                                               
38 λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡµῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός· 
τὰ δὲ µετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πειρᾶται ἡµᾶς ὅτι µάλιστα ποιῆσαι µὴ Ὅµηρον δοκεῖν 
εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι οὕτω πεποίηται διήγησιν 
περί τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλῃ Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθηµάτων. 
Πάνυ µὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
Οὐκοῦν διήγησις µέν ἐστιν καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἑκάστοτε λέγῃ καὶ ὅταν τὰ µεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων; 
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 
Ἀλλ’ ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὥς τις ἄλλος ὤν, ἆρ’ οὐ τότε ὁµοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσοµεν ὅτι µάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ λέξιν 
ἑκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα; 
Φήσοµεν· τί γάρ; 
Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁµοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆµα µιµεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁµοιοῖ;  
Τί µήν; 
Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ µιµήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. 
Πάνυ µὲν οὖν. 
Εἰ δέ γε µηδαµοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ µιµήσεως ἡ ποίησίς τε καὶ διήγησις 
γεγονυῖα εἴη. 
39 M.M. McCabe has developed these points in detail in her Sather lectures, which have not yet been published. 
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to be sufficient for µίµησις: “Now, to make oneself like someone else in voice or appearance 
is to represent the person one makes oneself like”. This is, I submit, the language of 
representation by resemblance par excellence. Indeed, it closely resembles the language of the 
bed passage of Book X, where µίµησις was said to be πρὸς τὸ φαινόµενον, ὡς φαίνεται. In both 
passages, then, we see not just consistent notions of µίµησις, but really the very same notion.  
Although this passage in some ways conforms to Lear’s account, since here it really does seem 
to be a case of making oneself similar to something else, that is due to a particularity of this 
case and not of µίµησις in general. For here we have a confluence of the subject and object of 
the representation: Homer and Chryses are both people. When that happens, to create the 
similarity required for the representation, Homer’s appearance (in this case, his voice and 
speech patterns) must in some way change. But µίµησις in general does not have this feature, 
since the subject and object of a representation can be very different kinds of things: a musical 
mode and a character trait, for example. In these cases, no change is necessary in the 
appearance of the subject in order for it to represent its object.  
If what I have said about Book X is correct, however, I must nevertheless give a fuller account 
of how poetry with simple narration will be an example of µίµησις. It must first be 
acknowledged that Plato does not claim that it is so in this passage. However, how clearly Book 
X subsumes all poetry under the heading of µίµησις, any attempt to reconcile all of these 
passages must say how this is so and, if possible, why Plato does not mention the mimetic 
aspect of poetry with simple narration in these passages. 
Earlier I suggested that the key to answering the first question will come from seeing how 
meter is mimetic and that the discussion of rhythm will be of help here. In Socrates’ view, 
rhythm represents character through its combinations of feet, although he is himself unsure 
about which combinations represent which characters. If we take the same view of meter, we 
can readily see how all poetry (that is, metered speech) is mimetic. Moreover, all poetry on 
this account represents features that are extremely important to the Guardians’ education, 
namely the sorts of character traits that are either desirable or undesirable. The relevance, then, 
of all forms of poetry, even kinds that do not contain any first-person narration like dithyrambs, 
to Platonic critique now makes quite a lot of sense. 
But now we are even deeper into the second question from above. Why doesn’t Plato here 
mention the other ways that poetry can be mimetic, if that is so important? I submit that this is 
because Socrates needs the discussion of rhythm, which would only take place later, in order 
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to make this clear. In his transition from discussion of λόγος to λέξις, Socrates first discusses 
ways of making µίµησις that are linguistic in nature (e.g., the choice of pronouns) and only 




I have argued that there is a single consistent notion of µίµησις as representation by 
resemblance in Plato’s Republic. I have not yet shown how this notion can play the role Plato 
intends in his criticism of poetry.40 An in-depth exploration of these issues goes well beyond 
the scope of this paper. In conclusion, however, I will say something briefly about how my 
account can elucidate Socrates’ criticism. I will suggest that, although there is but one 
conception of µίµησις throughout, Socrates focuses on different aspects of that account in 
different passages.  
Book III’s critique is centered on the educational role of the mimetic arts and their effects on 
prospective guardians. Here it is notable that the mimetic objects discussed in these passages 
are character traits. Plato is particularly interested in the ways in which different forms of 
µίµησις give rise to different sorts of characters, since this is of course crucial if we will have 
a just city. The aspect of the mimetic arts that is most relevant in this context turns out to be 
that they come about by resemblance. The resemblance to both good and bad character traits 
is essential to the psychological mechanism that can lead souls in good or bad directions. In 
Book X, by contrast, what is most important is that µίµησις is a sort of representation. Here the 
fact that it is representational and it represents not forms but sensibles is crucial to Socrates’ 
argument that the poets can create their artworks without any knowledge of what they are 
discussing (598d ff). The fundamental problem, it seems, is that people like Homer were taken 
to be very knowledgeable about the topics of their poems simply because those poems were 
beautiful. Socrates objects that, because they have only created representations of appearances, 
no knowledge of anything beyond those appearances was necessary for the creation of the 
artwork. Indeed, Homer could unknowingly represent good characters as bad and vice versa, 
which, if we take pleasure in that representation, distort our own images of what is good and 
bad. Together with the psychological story of Books II–III, this raises the seriously dangerous 
possibility that Homeric poetry could harm citizens if presented as an ethical ideal. 
                                               
40 On this, see Ferrari 1990. 
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There is, of course, much more to be said about how the notion of µίµησις can elucidate Plato’s 
critique of the arts. What I hope to have shown is that attention to the wide variety of, especially 
musical, arts can shed significant light on those well-trodden passages on poetry. 
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